

TRANSPORTATION SAFETY  
BUREAU OF HUNGARY

# FINAL REPORT

**2015-263-4P  
INCIDENT**

**Hungary  
24 August 2015**

**Airbus A319  
F-GRHK**

The sole objective of the technical investigation is to reveal the causes and circumstances of aviation accidents, incidents or irregularities and to initiate the necessary technical measures and draw up recommendations in order to prevent similar cases in the future. The technical investigation is not intended in any way to determine the liability or fault.

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## THE STATUS OF THE INVESTIGATION

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### **This investigation was carried out on the basis of**

- Regulation (EC) No 996/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 October 2010 on the investigation and prevention of accidents and incidents in civil aviation and repealing Directive 94/56/EC,
- Act XCVII of 1995 on aviation,
- Annex 13 identified in the Appendix of Act XLVI. of 2007 on the declaration of the annexes of the Convention on International Civil Aviation signed in Chicago on 7 December 1944,
- Act CLXXXIV of 2005 on the technical investigation of aviation, railway and marine accidents and incidents (hereinafter referred as Kbvt.),
- Decree No 70/2015 (XII.1.) of the Minister of National Development on safety investigation of aviation accident and incident, as well as on detailed investigation rules for operators,
- Act CXL of 2004 on the general rules of administrative authority procedure and service unless otherwise specified in Kbvt.,

by the Transportation Safety Bureau of Hungary, applying the above provisions appropriately.

The competence of Transportation Safety Bureau is based on Government Decree 278/2006 (XII. 23.) and, from 1 September 2016, on Government Decree 230/2016 (VII. 29.) on the assignment of a transport safety body and the termination of Transportation Safety Bureau with legal succession.

### **Under the aforementioned regulations**

- The Transportation Safety Bureau (hereinafter referred to as TSB) shall investigate aviation accidents and serious aviation incidents.
- The Transportation Safety Bureau may investigate aviation incidents and irregularities which - in its judgment - might have resulted in accidents in other circumstances.
- The Transportation Safety Bureau is independent of any person or body whose interest are in conflict with the functions of the investigating body.
- In addition to the aforementioned laws, the Transportation Safety Bureau applies the contents of the ICAO Doc 9760 and Doc 6920 Manual of Aircraft Accident Investigation.
- This Final Report shall not be binding, nor shall an appeal be lodged against it.

No conflict of interest has arisen in connection with the members of the Investigating Committee (IC). Persons participating in the technical investigation shall not act as experts in other procedures concerning the same case.

The IC shall safe keep the data having come to their knowledge in the course of the technical investigation. Furthermore the IC shall not be obliged to make the data – regarding which the owner of the data could have refused the disclosure of the data pursuant to the relevant act – available to other authorities.

### **This Final Report**

was based on the draft final report which prepared by the IC and sent to all affected parties (as stipulated by the relevant regulation) for comments.

This document is the translation of the Hungarian version of the final report. Although efforts have been made to translate it as accurately as possible, discrepancies may occur. In this case, the Hungarian is the authentic, official version.

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**DESCRIPTION OF THE OCCURENCE**


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**Occurrence class** Incident  
**Aircraft registration** F-GRHK  
**Aircraft operator** Société Air France, S.A.  
**Occurrence location** Hungary  
**Occurrence date and time** 24 August 2015 6:55 LT

**Investigation Committee (IC)**

The Director General of the TSB assigned the following Investigating Committee (hereinafter referred to as IC) for the investigation of the incident on 17 July 2016

**Investigator-in-Charge (IIC)** György Háý, investigator  
**IC member** Ferenc Kamasz, investigator

**Overview of the investigation process**

After the aircraft landed, the IC viewed and photographed it, questioned the crew, and photocopied the relevant documents of the crew, the aircraft, and the flight. Following the obtaining and evaluation of information, TSB changed the occurrence category from "serious incident" to "incident".

**Data of the Aircraft**

<b>Aircraft category</b>	fixed wing
<b>Aircraft sub-category</b>	large aeroplane
<b>Aircraft type</b>	A319
<b>Aircraft manufacturer</b>	Airbus SAS
<b>Aircraft year of manufacture</b>	2000.
<b>Aircraft identification / S/N</b>	F-GRHK / 1190
<b>Landing gear type</b>	tricycle, retractable
<b>Propulsion type</b>	turbofan
<b>Engine type</b>	CFM56-5B5
<b>Number of engine(s)</b>	2 pcs
<b>Damage aircraft</b>	no damage

**Data of the Flight**

<b>Flight Rules</b>	IFR
<b>Purpose of Flight</b>	commercial air transport
<b>Location and Time of the Take Off</b>	LHBP / BUD 06:43 LT
<b>Location and time of the landing</b>	LHBP / BUD 07:08 LT

**Meteorological Data**

<b>Visual conditions</b>	VMC
<b>Light conditions</b>	daylight

## Crew Data

		Position	License category	Medical cert.
1.	Pilot-In-Command	pilot plying (PF)	ATPL	Class 1
2.	Co-pilot (F/O)	pilot monitoring (PM)	ATPL	Class 1

## Personal Injuries

No personal injuries during the occurrence.

## History of the flight

12 minutes after take-off, the crew of the flight reported MAYDAY due to the smell of smoke perceived in the cockpit, and they returned to Budapest. The air traffic control service at the airport issued "expected aircraft emergency" alert. During approach, the flight crew reported to the air traffic control service that smoke had disappeared from the cockpit. Following a smooth landing and taxiing of the aircraft to Stand 220, the alert at the airport was cancelled.

The inspection performed after landing found that the display (EWD: Engine Warning Display) in the top middle part of the cockpit dashboard had failed. The inspection performed by experts from the authorized maintenance organisation also found that the defect was limited to the inside of the physically integrated display unit. No signs of mechanical damage or heat impact were seen around the failed device.

The defect was temporarily eliminated by swapping the lower (SDU: System Display Unit) and upper (EWD) display units situated in the middle part of the dashboard. After successful completion of the required tests and inspections, the expert from the authorized maintenance organisation released the aircraft to service, with taking DIR, pursuant to MEL 31-63-05A, and the aircraft left Budapest.

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## ANALISYS

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The incident was evoked by internal failure of the top middle display unit (EWD) of the cockpit dashboard. Detailed exploration of the mechanism of the failure would go beyond the limits of this investigation.

When perceiving the odour of smoke, the flight crew could not know the nature and extent of the failure yet. Accordingly, they applied the procedure appropriate for the most serious case possible, i.e. the appearing of fire in the cockpit: they put on oxygen masks, interrupted climbing, reported MAYDAY, and returned to Budapest. On the basis of the information available, the air traffic control service at the airport ordered "expected aircraft emergency" alert which was cancelled immediately after the aircraft landed and taxied smoothly to a stand.

When it turned out that the defect was limited solely to the inside of the display unit, the technicians swapped the lower and upper display units situated in the middle part of the dashboard. According to inspections and tests performed after the change, the top (EWD) display worked perfectly, while the unserviceable display unit was put in the electrically disconnected lower (SDU) position. As MEL 31-63-05A allows the aircraft to fly with temporarily unserviceable lower (SDU) display, the expert from authorized maintenance organisation released the aircraft to service.

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## FINDINGS

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### Event causes

During the technical investigation the IC concluded that the cause of the incident was;

- the top middle display unit (EWD) of the cockpit dashboard failed seriously.



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**SAFETY RECOMMENDATION**

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The TSB IC did not find such circumstances which would justify the issuance of Safety Recommendations.

Budapest, 5<sup>th</sup> January 2018

  
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Mr. György Háy  
Investigator-in-Charge (IIC)  
.....  
Mr. Ferenc Kamasz  
IC member

