



MINISTRY OF CONSTRUCTION AND TRANSPORT

TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BUREAU

FINAL REPORT

(English Language Summary)

Schleicher K-8B, HA-4012
Tapolca Airfield, 07 July, 2024

Accident
2024-0989-4

**This is an English language abstract of the official safety report written in Hungarian.
Final Reports are published at www.kbsz.hu.**

The sole objective of a safety investigation is to find the causes and circumstances of aviation accidents or incidents and to initiate the necessary safety measures; furthermore, to make recommendations in order to prevent similar cases in the future. It is not the objective of an investigation to apportion blame or liability.

Introduction

Synopsis

Occurrence Class	Accident	
Aircraft	Manufacturer	Alexander Schleicher GmbH & Co.
	Model	K-8B
	Registration	HA-4012
	Operator	Private
Occurrence	Date and Time	07 July, 2024, 12:19 LT
	Location	Tapolca Airfield (LHTP)
Fatalities / Severe Injuries		0 / 1
Damage to Aircraft		Destroyed

On July 7, 2024, at 12:19 p.m., the pilot with the intention of a private flight took off from runway 34 of Tapolca Airfield in a Schleicher K-8B glider (HA-4012). In the initial stage of the winch launch the aircraft climbed at a steep angle and subsequently dove in a right bank towards the take-off point from a height of approximately 50 meters. The glider hit the ground with the right wingtip, which spun the aircraft another 180 degrees. The nose crashed into the ground next to the runway and the pilot suffered a serious leg injury in the accident.

The IC concluded in its investigation that the direct cause of the accident was the pilot's loss of control of his aircraft due to a decrease of situational awareness during the initial, critical phase of the winch launch. The IC also identified an additional contributing factor.

The TSB did not identify any specific conditions that would warrant the issuing of a safety recommendation.



Figure 1.

General information

All times indicated in this report are in local time (LT). LT at the time of the occurrence was UTC+2 hours.

Geographic locations throughout this document are provided by WGS-84 standard.

The format and content of this report is in harmony with Chapter 6 of Annex 13 of Act XLVI of 2007 promulgating the Appendices to the Convention on International Civil Aviation, signed in Chicago on 7 December 1944. Appendix, as well as with the requirements set out in ICAO Doc 9756 Part IV.

Reports and Notifications

The occurrence was reported to the TSB's call centre at 12:38 on 07 July, 2024 by the flight coordinator.

In line with Article 9, Section (2) of Regulation (EU) No 996/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council, TSB of Hungary notified the following organisations.

- EASA on 08/07/2024 at 12:53.
- Accident Investigation Authority of the State of Manufacture on 08/07/2024 at 13:03.

Investigation Committee

The Head of the TSB appointed the following persons in the investigating committee (hereinafter: IC).

Investigator-in-Charge	Mr. Gábor Erdősi	investigator
Member	Mr. Ákos Hanczár	investigator

Overview of the Investigation Process

Upon receiving notification of the event, the on-duty TSB supervisor mandated an immediate dispatch to the site.

The TSB classified the event as accident due to the damage and injuries to the aircraft and the pilot.

Pursuant to Article 5 of REGULATION (EU) No 996/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 October 2010 on the investigation and prevention of accidents and incidents in civil aviation and repealing Directive 94/56/ECA the TSB is required to initiate an investigation in the following circumstances.

1. *Every accident or serious incident involving aircraft other than specified in Annex II to Regulation (EC) No 216/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 February 2008 on common rules in the field of civil aviation and establishing a European Aviation Safety Agency shall be the subject of a safety investigation in the Member State in the territory of which the accident or serious incident occurred.*
2. *When an aircraft, other than specified in Annex II to Regulation (EC) No 216/2008, registered in a Member State is involved in an accident or serious incident the location of which cannot be definitely established as being in the territory of any State, a safety investigation shall be conducted by the safety investigation authority of the Member State of registration.*
3. *The extent of safety investigations referred to in paragraphs 1, 2 and 4 and the procedure to be followed in conducting such safety investigations shall be determined by the safety investigation authority, taking into account the lessons it expects to draw*

from such investigations for the improvement of aviation safety, including for those aircraft with a maximum take-off mass less than or equal to 2 250 kg.

4. *Safety investigation authorities may decide to investigate incidents other than those referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2, as well as accidents or serious incidents to other types of aircraft, in accordance with the national legislation of the Member States, when they expect to draw safety lessons from them.*

Based on the findings of the site inspection and with regard to Article 5 (1) of Regulation (EU) No 996/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council, the head of the TSB decided that an investigation is required and will be launched.

In the course of the investigation the IC has taken the following steps:

- carried out a site survey and took photographs;
- obtained the aircraft on-board documents;
- obtained the pilot's documents;
- interviewed the pilot, flight coordinator and the winch operator;
- obtained the geographical area's meteorological information;
- obtained the type of the winch line and its break strength testing documentation.

Investigation Principles

This investigation is being carried out by Transportation Safety Bureau on the basis of the following disciplines.

- Regulation (EU) No 996/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 October 2010 on the investigation and prevention of accidents and incidents in civil aviation and repealing Directive 94/56/EC,
- Act XCVII of 1995 on aviation,
- Annex 13 identified in the Appendix of Act XLVI. of 2007 on the declaration of the annexes to the Convention on International Civil Aviation signed in Chicago on 7th December 1944,
- Act CLXXXIV of 2005 on the safety investigation of aviation, railway and marine accidents and incidents (referred to as Kbt. throughout the document),
- NFM (Ministry for National Development) Regulation 70/2015 (XII.1) on safety investigation of aviation accidents and incidents, as well as on detailed investigation for operators,
- In matters not covered by Kbt., Act CL of 2016 on General Public Administration Procedures prevails.

The competence of the Transportation Safety Bureau of Hungary is based on Government Regulation № 230/2016. (VII.29.) on the assignment of a transportation safety body and on the dissolution of Transportation Safety Bureau with legal succession.

Pursuant to the aforesaid legislation,

- Transportation Safety Bureau of Hungary shall investigate aviation accidents and serious incidents.
- Transportation Safety Bureau of Hungary may investigate aviation and incidents, which in its judgement – could have led to accidents of more severe consequences in different circumstances.
- Transportation Safety Bureau of Hungary is independent of any person or entity that may have interests in conflict with the objectives of the investigating body.
- In addition to the aforementioned legislation, TSB of Hungary shall conduct safety investigations in line with ICAO Docs 9756 and 6920 Manual of Aircraft Accident Investigation.
- This Report shall not be binding, nor shall an appeal be lodged against it.

- The original of this report was written in Hungarian.

No conflict of interest has been identified between safety investigators appointed to the IC. Investigators assigned to a safety investigation shall not be involved as experts in any other procedure pertaining to the same case and shall refrain from doing so in the future.

The IC shall retain all data and information having come to their knowledge in the course of the safety investigation. Furthermore, the IC shall not be obliged to make such data and information available to other authorities, if their original owner could have legally refused disclosure.

This Final Report is based on the Draft Report prepared by the IC that was sent to all involved parties for comments, as set forth by the relevant regulations.

No alternative or contradictory opinions, comments or expression of dissent have been received from the parties involved before the legal deadline set for comments and revisions.

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With the exceptions stipulated by law, this report or any part thereof may be used in any form, provided that context is maintained and clear references are made to the cited source.

Translation

This summary is based on the full report written in Hungarian. Although efforts have been made to provide a translation as accurate as possible, discrepancies between the versions might occur. In such eventuality, the Hungarian version shall prevail.

Factual information

Flight History

The pilot arrived at the airfield around 8:30 in the morning with the purpose of carrying out promotion flights for schoolchildren and private flights. The flights were conducted on runway 34 with winch launch. The pilot performed two flights with a passenger in a Góbé R-26S glider during the morning. After that, he was scheduled to fly a Schleicher K-8B, registration HA-4012, for the purpose of the private flights. Before departure he pre-flight checked the aircraft and found no discrepancies. Before the third take-off of the day – which was the accident flight – he signalled “ready for winch launch” to the flight coordinator. The launch, using a synthetic line, was performed by an experienced winch operator who, according to his account, executed the winch in accordance with regular standards. The pilot had no prior experience in synthetic line launches. At the early stage of the take-off, the pilot felt that his aircraft was having difficulty climbing, as if it had received a gust of wind from behind. After climbing, at an altitude of approximately 50 meters, he felt that the aircraft had received yet another gust from behind. He quoted in his own words that he thought he should have released the cable at that point and carried out a line break procedure, pushing the stick forward to pick up speed, and land straight ahead. He claims though, to have considered an option he had heard from other pilots about line breaks using synthetic lines never having occurred in the club’s history. Preoccupied with these thoughts, he became distracted enough to miss correcting in time for dropping airspeed. By the time he finally released the cable, the aircraft was in a right bank, which the pilot tried to counter applying full left stick. The controls proved to be insufficient to stop the bank though. To the pilot’s belief, this was due to the low speed of the glider. The aircraft’s right wing eventually dropped and entered an aerodynamic stall. The glider subsequently swung right 180 degrees and with the right wing’s leading edge hitting the ground, spinning the aircraft another 180 degrees, before the nose finally crashed into the ground. The pilot’s right leg was lodged and trapped between the damaged rudder pedals. The injured pilot was taken to hospital after being freed from the wreckage.

The flight coordinator monitored the winch progress and said that the winch launch itself seemed slow and the aircraft was “flying at a high pitch angle for its speed.” He interpreted the aircraft’s banking as the pilot’s half-hearted signalling for increased speed towards the winch operator. According to the flight coordinator, following the “wing rocking,” the aircraft pitched even higher until it finally stalled.

Conclusions

Findings

The pilot had a valid glider pilot license, but his privileges did not include flying promotion flights.

The IC concluded during its investigation that the direct cause of the occurrence was the pilot's delayed corrective action in response to the gradual loss of airspeed during the initial phase of an unduly steep winch launch, which resulted in a stall of the right wing and the subsequent loss of control over the aircraft.

The IC identified elements of the weather (wind) as a contributing factor.

The IC Investigation Committee of the TSB did not find any circumstances necessitating a safety recommendation.

Safety Recommendations

The IC issued no safety recommendation.

Dated in Budapest, on 22 April, 2025