



MINISTRY OF CONSTRUCTION AND TRANSPORT

TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BUREAU

FINAL REPORT

(English Language Summary)

Socata Morane MS-893 E, HA-VEF
Kecskéd airfield (LHKD), 04 May, 2024

Serious Incident
2024-0612-4

**This is an English language abstract of the official safety report written in Hungarian.
Final Reports are published at www.kbsz.hu.**

The sole objective of a safety investigation is to find the causes and circumstances of aviation accidents or incidents and to initiate the necessary safety measures; furthermore, to make recommendations in order to prevent similar cases in the future. It is not the objective of an investigation to apportion blame or liability.

Introduction

Synopsis

Occurrence class		Serious Incident
Aircraft	Manufacturer	Socata Tarbes, France ¹
	Model	Morane MS-893 E
	Registration	HA-VEF
	Operator	Aeroclub Kecskéd
Occurrence	Date and Time	04 May, 2024, 13:38 LT
	Location	Kecskéd airfield (LHKD)
Fatalities / Severe Injuries		0 / 0
Damage to Aircraft		substantial

On the day of the event, the Pilot performed training flights from Kecskéd airfield with the Socata Morane MS-893-E fixed-wing aircraft, registration HA-VEF. During the tailwind approach to Runway 33, according to the Pilot the aircraft had difficulty losing altitude. After the first touchdown, the propeller hit the ground. The aircraft then lifted off the ground again, touched down after another 8.8 meters, and came to a stop after sliding 76.9 meters. During the incident, the nose gear shaft broke and the propeller sustained significant damage, while the exhaust pipe was slightly damaged. The Transportation Safety Bureau (TSB) received the report late, so an immediate on-site survey was not possible. The TSB inspected the aircraft and the runway and interviewed the Pilot a few days later.

The Transportation Safety Bureau's Investigation Committee (hereinafter "IC") attributed the event to the improperly executed landing and identified as contributing factors the lack of flight experience on the given aircraft model, the possible lack of concentration due to emotional stress and the runway conditions. The IC found no grounds to issue a safety recommendation.



Figure 1. The HA-VEF aircraft (source: the Pilot)

¹ based on the aircraft registration certificate

General information

All times indicated in this report are in local time (LT). LT at the time of the occurrence: UTC+2 hours.

Geographic locations throughout this document are provided by WGS-84 standard.

Capitalised references used throughout this document (e.g. Captain, Pilot, etc.) denote particular persons concerned in the event investigated.

The format and content of this report is in harmony with Chapter 6 of Annex 13 of Act XLVI of 2007 promulgating the Appendices to the Convention on International Civil Aviation, signed in Chicago on 7 December 1944. Appendix, as well as with the requirements set out in ICAO Doc 9756 Part IV.

Reports and Notifications

The occurrence was reported to TSB's call center at 17:42 on 6/05/2024 by the Pilot.

In line with Article 9, Section (2) of Regulation (EU) No 996/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council, TSB of Hungary notified the following organisations.

- Accident Investigation Authority of the State of Operator/Design on 9/05/2024 at 16:45.
- EASA on 09/05/2024 at 16:45.

Investigation Committee

The Head of TSB appointed the following persons in the investigating committee (hereinafter: IC).

Investigator-in-Charge	Zsigmond Nagy	chief investigator
Member	Eszter Gula	investigator

Overview of the Investigation Process

The Transportation Safety Bureau (TSB) only became aware of the event two days later. Following the report, the TSB's on-call manager ordered a retrospective on-site inspection.

Due to the extent of the aircraft's damage, the TSB classified the event as a serious incident.

Pursuant to Article 5 of REGULATION (EU) No 996/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 October 2010 on the investigation and prevention of accidents and incidents in civil aviation and repealing Directive 94/56/ECA the TSB is required to initiate an investigation in the following circumstances.

1. *Every accident or serious incident involving aircraft to which Regulation (EU) 2018/1139 of the European Parliament and of the Council applies shall be the subject of a safety investigation in the Member State in which the accident or serious incident occurred.*
2. *Where an aircraft to which Regulation (EU) 2018/1139 applies and which is registered in a Member State is involved in an accident or a serious incident the location of which cannot be definitely established as being in the territory of any State, a safety investigation shall be conducted by the safety investigation authority of the Member State of registration.*
3. *The extent of safety investigations referred to in paragraphs 1, 2 and 4 and the procedure to be followed in conducting such safety investigations shall be determined by the safety investigation authority, taking into account the consequences of the accident or serious incident and the lessons it expects to draw from such investigations for the improvement of aviation safety.*

4. *Safety investigation authorities may decide to investigate incidents other than those referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2, as well as accidents or serious incidents to other types of aircraft, in accordance with the national legislation of the Member States, when they expect to draw safety lessons from them.*
5. *By way of derogation from paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article, the responsible safety investigation authority may decide, taking into account the expected lessons to be drawn for the improvement of aviation safety, not to initiate a safety investigation when an accident or serious incident concerns an unmanned aircraft for which a certificate or declaration is not required pursuant to Article 56(1) and (5) of Regulation (EU) 2018/1139, or concerns a manned aircraft with a maximum take-off mass less than or equal to 2 250 kg, and where no person has been fatally or seriously injured.*

Based on the findings of the site inspection and with regard to Article 5 (1) of Regulation (EU) No 996/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council, the head of the TSB decided that an investigation is required and will be launched.

In the course of the investigation the IC has taken the following steps:

- Conducted site survey, during which photographs were taken of the aircraft and of the on-board documentation;
- Recorded ground marks at the airport;
- Interviewed the Pilot;
- Obtained the Pilot's documents;
- Seized the aircraft for further examinations;
- Acquired weather data from the HungaroMet, the Hungarian Meteorological Service Nonprofit Zrt.;
- Examined the damaged nose gear;
- Interviewed the relevant representative of the aviation safety service organization involved in reporting the incident.

Investigation Principles

This investigation is being carried out by Transportation Safety Bureau on the basis of the following disciplines.

- Regulation (EU) No 996/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 October 2010 on the investigation and prevention of accidents and incidents in civil aviation and repealing Directive 94/56/EC,
- Act XCVII of 1995 on aviation,
- Annex 13 identified in the Appendix of Act XLVI. of 2007 on the declaration of the annexes to the Convention on International Civil Aviation signed in Chicago on 7th December 1944,
- Act CLXXXIV of 2005 on the safety investigation of aviation, railway and marine accidents and incidents (referred to as Kbvt. throughout the document),
- NFM (Ministry for National Development) Regulation 70/2015 (XII.1) on safety investigation of aviation accidents and incidents, as well as on detailed investigation for operators,
- In matters not covered by Kbvt., Act CL of 2016 on General Public Administration Procedures prevails.

The competence of the Transportation Safety Bureau of Hungary is based on Government Regulation № 230/2016. (VII.29.) on the assignment of a transportation safety body and on the dissolution of Transportation Safety Bureau with legal succession.

Pursuant to the aforesaid legislation,

- Transportation Safety Bureau of Hungary shall investigate aviation accidents and serious incidents.
- Transportation Safety Bureau of Hungary may investigate aviation and incidents which – in its judgement – could have led to accidents of more severe consequences in different circumstances.
- Transportation Safety Bureau of Hungary is independent of any person or entity that may have interests in conflict with the objectives of the investigating body.
- In addition to the aforementioned legislation, TSB of Hungary shall conduct safety investigations in line with ICAO Docs 9756 and 6920 Manual of Aircraft Accident Investigation.
- This Report shall not be binding, nor shall an appeal be lodged against it.
- The original of this report was written in Hungarian.

No conflict of interest has been identified between safety investigators appointed to the IC. Investigators assigned to a safety investigation shall not be involved as experts in any other procedure pertaining to the same case and shall refrain from doing so in the future.

The IC shall retain all data and information having come to their knowledge in the course of the safety investigation. Furthermore, the IC shall not be obliged to make such data and information available to other authorities, if their original owner could have legally refused disclosure.

This Final Report is based on the Draft Report prepared by the IC that was sent to all involved parties for comments, as set forth by the relevant regulations.

Until the legal deadline for comments and revisions, no alternative or contradictory opinions, comments or expression of dissent have been received from the parties involved.

Translation

This summary is based on the full report written in Hungarian. Although efforts have been made to provide a translation as accurate as possible, discrepancies between the versions might occur. In such eventuality, the Hungarian version shall prevail.

Factual information

Flight History

The Pilot reported that he arrived at 8:00 AM to Kecskéd airfield (LHKD) for VFR flights on the morning of May 4, 2024. Glider operations and an aviation event were taking place simultaneously at the airfield, and Runway 33 was in use. In the morning, the Pilot flew three traffic patterns, totalling 21 minutes of flight time, and planned to fly again in the afternoon. After take-off at 13:28, he left the traffic pattern, headed toward Tatabánya and a little later began the approach from Várgesztes, approximately seven kilometres from the runway. He joined the traffic circuit at 2,000 feet near Lake Majk (on the centreline of RWY33, about 1.6 km from the threshold). The Pilot reported that the aircraft did not lose enough altitude during the approach, so he deployed full flaps, but still felt that the descent was insufficient, prompting him to decide on a "long approach." Based on the recorded meteorological data the wind during the flight was variable, and the Pilot reported experiencing a slight tailwind during the approach. He stated that he was approaching at a speed of 100-110 km/h with full flaps and idle power. After touchdown, he felt that the aircraft briefly dipped its nose, and then "something bounced the main landing gear." Subsequently, the aircraft lifted off again, then touched down nose-first and after some sliding, came to a stop. No injuries occurred during the incident. After the event, the aircraft was towed off the runway, and the incident was reported to an aviation safety organization. Two days after the incident, on May 6, the Pilot returned the incident report that he previously received from the aviation safety organization and then notified the TSB by phone.

Conclusions

As a result of the investigation the IC concluded that the cause of the event was the improper execution of the landing, which led to damage to both the propeller and the nose gear.

In addition to the above, the IC identified the lack of flight experience on the given aircraft model, the possible lack of concentration due to emotional stress and the runway conditions as contributing factors.

According to the IC, a go-around and a repeated approach could have prevented the serious incident.

Safety Recommendations

The IC issued no safety recommendation.

Dated in Budapest, on 06 December, 2024