



MINISTRY OF CONSTRUCTION AND TRANSPORT

TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BUREAU

FINAL REPORT

(English Language Summary)

P2002-JF, HA-TEF

Gödöllő Airport (LHGD), 20/05/2023

Serious Incident

2023-0574-4

**This is an English language abstract of the official safety report written in Hungarian.
Final Reports are published at www.kbsz.hu.**

The sole objective of a safety investigation is to find the causes and circumstances of aviation accidents or incidents and to initiate the necessary safety measures; furthermore, to make recommendations in order to prevent similar cases in the future. It is not the objective of an investigation to apportion blame or liability.

Introduction

Synopsis

Occurrence class	Serious Incident	
Aircraft	Manufacturer	Construzioni Aeronautiche TECNAM, s.r.l. Italy
	Model	P 2002-JF
	Registration	HA-TEF
	Operator	Cavok Aviation Training Kft.
Occurrence	Date and Time	20 May 2023, 12:12 LT
	Location	Gödöllő Airport (LHGD)
Fatalities / Severe Injuries		0 persons
Damage to Aircraft		Significantly damaged

The pilot involved in the incident landed the Tecnam P2002-JF aircraft, registration mark HA-TEF, on runway 13 of Gödöllő airport after a cross-country flight of more than 3 hours. After landing, however, the pilot lost control of the aircraft and, after a relatively high-speed left and then right turn, the aircraft came to a stop on the right side of the runway at the same time as the nose of the aircraft broke off.

There were no injuries, but the aircraft was significantly damaged.

In the course of its safety investigation, the IC concluded that the cause of the occurrence was that the pilot was no longer able to manage the workload resulting from a maintenance problem, due to her physical and mental state at the end of the flight.

In addition, the IC identified the runway quality problem and the meteorological factor as contributing factors.

The TSB's Investigating Committee found no circumstances that would justify a safety recommendation.



Figure 1: The aircraft at the occurrence site

General information

All times indicated in this report are in local time (LT). LT at the time of the occurrence: UTC+2 hours.

Geographic locations throughout this document are provided by WGS-84 standard.

Capitalised references used throughout this document (e.g. Captain, Pilot, etc.) denote particular persons concerned in the event investigated.

The format and content of this report is in harmony with Chapter 6 of Annex 13 of Act XLVI of 2007 promulgating the Appendices to the Convention on International Civil Aviation, signed in Chicago on 7 December 1944. Appendix, as well as with the requirements set out in ICAO Doc 9756 Part IV.

Reports and Notifications

The occurrence was reported to TSB's call center at 12:28 on 20/05/2023, by the flight safety manager of the organisation involved.

In line with Article 9, Section (2) of Regulation (EU) No 996/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council, TSB of Hungary notified the following organisations.

- Accident Investigation Authority of the State of Manufacture on 22/05/2023 at 12:35.
- EASA on 22/05/2023 at 12:25.
- The Accident Investigation Authority of Japan, due to the nationality of the pilot, on 22/05/2023 at 13:39.

The following of the notified foreign organisations appointed an accredited representative for the investigation.

- State of the Manufacture of the aircraft: Italian Civil Aviation Safety Investigation Authority (ANSV)

Investigation Committee

The Head of TSB appointed the following persons in the investigating committee (hereinafter: IC).

Investigator-in-Charge	Gábor Erdősi	investigator
Member	Zsuzsanna Nacsá JD	investigator

Overview of the Investigation Process

Receiving event notification, the on-duty TSB supervisor mandated an immediate dispatch to the site.

The TSB classified the occurrence as a serious incident due to significant damage to the aircraft.

Pursuant to Article 5 of REGULATION (EU) No 996/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 October 2010 on the investigation and prevention of accidents and incidents in civil aviation and repealing Directive 94/56/ECA the TSB is required to initiate an investigation in the following circumstances.

1. *Every accident or serious incident involving aircraft to which Regulation (EU) 2018/1139 of the European Parliament and of the Council applies shall be the subject of a safety investigation in the Member State in which the accident or serious incident occurred.*

2. *Where an aircraft to which Regulation (EU) 2018/1139 applies and which is registered in a Member State is involved in an accident or a serious incident the location of which cannot be definitely established as being in the territory of any State, a safety investigation shall be conducted by the safety investigation authority of the Member State of registration.*
3. *The extent of safety investigations referred to in paragraphs 1, 2 and 4 and the procedure to be followed in conducting such safety investigations shall be determined by the safety investigation authority, taking into account the consequences of the accident or serious incident and the lessons it expects to draw from such investigations for the improvement of aviation safety.*
4. *Safety investigation authorities may decide to investigate incidents other than those referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2, as well as accidents or serious incidents to other types of aircraft, in accordance with the national legislation of the Member States, when they expect to draw safety lessons from them.*
5. *By way of derogation from paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article, the responsible safety investigation authority may decide, taking into account the expected lessons to be drawn for the improvement of aviation safety, not to initiate a safety investigation when an accident or serious incident concerns an unmanned aircraft for which a certificate or declaration is not required pursuant to Article 56(1) and (5) of Regulation (EU) 2018/1139, or concerns a manned aircraft with a maximum take-off mass less than or equal to 2 250 kg, and where no person has been fatally or seriously injured.*

Based on the findings of the site inspection and with regard to Article 5 (1) of Regulation (EU) No 996/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council, the head of the TSB decided that an investigation is required and will be launched.

In the course of the investigation the IC has taken the following steps:

- carried out a site survey to take photos, collect data and examine the aircraft;
- carried out an additional inspection, in a joint effort with the appointed judicial expert, to examine the aircraft involved;
- obtained the aircraft's maintenance documentation;
- obtained the documents generated by the police relating to the occurrence;
- obtained the expert opinion of the judicial expert appointed by the police;
- interviewed witnesses;
- obtained weather information relating to the date of the occurrence;
- obtained data relating to the cross-country flight that had ended in an occurrence;
- obtained the training organisation's report on the occurrence;
- analysed the data and information obtained.

Investigation Principles

This investigation is being carried out by Transportation Safety Bureau on the basis of the following disciplines.

- Regulation (EU) No 996/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 October 2010 on the investigation and prevention of accidents and incidents in civil aviation and repealing Directive 94/56/EC,
- Act XCVII of 1995 on aviation,
- Annex 13 identified in the Appendix of Act XLVI. of 2007 on the declaration of the annexes to the Convention on International Civil Aviation signed in Chicago on 7th December 1944,
- Act CLXXXIV of 2005 on the safety investigation of aviation, railway and marine accidents and incidents (referred to as Kbvt. throughout the document),

- NFM (Ministry for National Development) Regulation 70/2015 (XII.1) on safety investigation of aviation accidents and incidents, as well as on detailed investigation for operators,
- In matters not covered by Kbt., Act CL of 2016 on General Public Administration Procedures prevails.

The competence of the Transportation Safety Bureau of Hungary is based on Government Regulation № 230/2016. (VII.29.) on the assignment of a transportation safety body and on the dissolution of Transportation Safety Bureau with legal succession.

Pursuant to the aforesaid legislation,

- Transportation Safety Bureau of Hungary shall investigate aviation accidents and serious incidents.
- Transportation Safety Bureau of Hungary may investigate aviation and incidents which – in its judgement – could have led to accidents of more severe consequences in different circumstances.
- Transportation Safety Bureau of Hungary is independent of any person or entity that may have interests in conflict with the objectives of the investigating body.
- In addition to the aforementioned legislation, TSB of Hungary shall conduct safety investigations in line with ICAO Docs 9756 and 6920 Manual of Aircraft Accident Investigation.
- This Report shall not be binding, nor shall an appeal be lodged against it.
- The original of this report was written in Hungarian.

No conflict of interest has been identified between safety investigators appointed to the IC. Investigators assigned to a safety investigation shall not be involved as experts in any other procedure pertaining to the same case and shall refrain from doing so in the future.

The IC shall retain all data and information having come to their knowledge in the course of the safety investigation. Furthermore, the IC shall not be obliged to make such data and information available to other authorities, if their original owner could have legally refused disclosure.

This Final Report is based on the Draft Report prepared by the IC that was sent to all involved parties for comments, as set forth by the relevant regulations.

Within the legal deadline in response to the Draft Report, the IC have received amendment proposals for clarification. The IC prepared the final report by considering the comments received on the draft report as revised by parties involved.

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With the exceptions stipulated by law, this report or any part thereof may be used in any form, provided that context is maintained and clear references are made to the cited source.

Translation

This summary is based on the full report written in Hungarian. Although efforts have been made to provide a translation as accurate as possible, discrepancies between the versions might occur. In such eventuality, the Hungarian version shall prevail.

Factual information

Flight History

According to the pilot involved in the incident, she arrived at Gödöllő airport on the day of the incident (20 May 2023) well rested and planned to perform a VFR cross-country flight in a TECNAM P2002JF aircraft with the registration HA-TEF to gain flying time and to explore a less familiar part of the country. The pilot stated that, apart from a minor oil leak, the pre-flight inspection had found the aircraft to be airworthy. After preparation of the aircraft and completion of the pre-flight checks, the aircraft commenced its flight at 09:00 hours, in accordance with the flight plan previously submitted. According to the pilot, during the flight, she found that the throttle lever locking ring, which had been operating precariously, was not doing its job at all, and she had to keep the throttle using her left hand. After crossing the Danube, the aircraft was heading towards Pécs (*for the aircraft's route, see: Figure 3*) so, before reaching the Mecsek hills, she had to climb in order to adapt to the terrain. Then, on the north-northeast-bound section of the route over the Somogyi hills near Kaposvár, the pilot was informed that she would have to change course due to a military airspace activated after her take-off. According to the pilot, she was not very comfortable with this task, because she had to navigate using a paper map over a part of the country she did not know, while keeping the throttle steady (she said she did not use GPS on the aircraft). She had to make this route change knowing that she also had to avoid the Siófok-Kiliti drop zone before reaching Székesfehérvár. According to the pilot, she was quite busy on this leg of the route until she reached Székesfehérvár. After a 3-hour flight in good weather conditions, the pilot arrived back in Gödöllő to find that there was a crosswind at the airport. In view of this crosswind, she joined the downwind leg of the right traffic circle of runway 13 and started to execute the landing with the intention to perform a full stop. However, after landing and slowing down with the flaps in the 40° position on the right runway 13, when the flaps were retracted (at their 15° position), she thought she still had time and therefore could take off again (touch & go). However, this did not happen because, according to her, while she was trying to steer the aircraft (which was slightly to the right of the runway centre line) back to the centre line (i.e. to the left) using the rudder pedal, the throttle lever “ran up”. The aircraft, which was steered slightly to the left, then moved to the left at almost full throttle. The pilot attempted to eliminate this situation by returning to the centre line and slowing down. According to her account, she attempted to ease off the throttle, now attempting to return to the centre line from left to right, and, as the tracks showed, she also tried to slow the aircraft by applying the brakes, and the aircraft finally came to rest after the nose wheel broke off on the right edge of the runway. These movements are not exactly recalled by the pilot, as she says, nor did she perceive the fracture of the nose landing gear until the aircraft came to rest. Retrospectively the pilot believes that she had lost control of the aircraft as it moved to the left at high speed.

There were no personal injuries during the incident, but the aircraft was significantly damaged.



Figure 2: Trace of the aircraft's right main landing gear

Conclusions

Causes

In the course of its safety investigation, the IC concluded that the cause of the occurrence was that the pilot was no longer able to manage the workload resulting from a maintenance problem, due to her physical and mental state at the end of the flight.

In addition, the IC found that the quality of the runway and the meteorological factor contributed to the occurrence.

Safety Recommendations

The IC issued no safety recommendation.

Dated in Budapest, on 24 September 2024