



ÉPÍTÉSI ÉS KÖZLEKEDÉSI MINISZTERIUM
KÖZLEKEDÉSBIZTONSÁGI SZERVEZET

FINAL REPORT

(English Language Summary)

Piper PA-34-200, HA-YCI
Békéscsaba Airport, 04 Aug 2021

Serious Incident
2021-0286-4

**This is an English language abstract of the official safety report written in Hungarian.
Final Reports are published at www.kbsz.hu.**

The sole objective of a safety investigation is to find the causes and circumstances of aviation accidents or incidents and to initiate the necessary safety measures; furthermore, to make recommendations in order to prevent similar cases in the future. It is not the objective of an investigation to apportion blame or liability.

Introduction

Synopsis

Occurrence class	Serious Incident	
Aircraft	Manufacturer	Piper PA-34-200
	Registration	HA-YCI
Occurrence	Date and Time	04 Aug, 2021, 09:39 LT ¹
	Location	Békéscsaba Airport (LHBC)
Purpose of the flight	non commercial (training)	
Fatalities / Severe Injuries	no injury	
Damage to Aircraft	Substantial	

During a Multi-Engine Class rating training, on 04 August 2021, an instructor (hereinafter: Instructor) and a student (hereinafter: Student) failed to extend the landing gear of a Piper PA-34-200 and failed to check if it had been done, which resulted in a belly landing – landing with the landing gear retracted – while doing a touch and go on runway 17L at Békéscsaba airport (LHBC). No personal injury occurred during the event, the aircraft was significantly damaged.

The IC attributed the direct cause of the serious flight incident to human factors related to the Instructor. The direct cause of the serious incident was the failure to extend the landing gear and the failure of double checking if it had been done, but the Student's lack of the theoretical and cabin familiarization training, his lack of practice in using checklists and the Hungarian signs in the flight deck also contributed to the event.

The Investigation Committee of the Transportation Safety Bureau found no grounds to issue a safety recommendation.



Figure 1.the aircraft after the accident

¹ Local Time

General information

All times indicated in this report are in local time (LT). LT at the time of the occurrence: UTC+2 hours.

Geographic locations throughout this document are provided in WGS-84 standard.

The capitalised positions used throughout this document (e.g. Captain, Pilot, etc.) refer to the particular persons concerned in the event investigated.

The format and content of this report is in harmony with Chapter 6 of Annex 13 of Act XLVI of 2007 promulgating the Appendices to the Convention on International Civil Aviation, signed in Chicago on 7 December 1944. Appendix, as well as with the requirements set out in ICAO Doc 9756 Part IV.

Reports and Notifications

The occurrence was reported to TSB's call center at 09:36 on 4th August 2021, by the aviation safety representative of the operator.

TSB of Hungary notified the following organisations:

- Accident Investigation Authority of the State of Design on 05/08/2021 at 12:30.
- Accident Investigation Authority of the other states involved on 05/08/2021 at 12:38.
- EASA on 05/08/2021 at 12:27.

Investigation Committee

The Head of TSB appointed the following persons in the investigating committee (hereinafter: IC).

Investigator-in-Charge	Miklós Ferenci	investigator
Member	Klementina Joó	investigator

Overview of the Investigation Process

Receiving event notification, the on-duty manager of the TSB ordered an immediate dispatch to the site.

Pursuant to Article 5 of REGULATION (EU) No 996/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 October 2010 on the investigation and prevention of accidents and incidents in civil aviation and repealing Directive 94/56/ECA the TSB is required to initiate an investigation in the following circumstances.

1. *Every accident or serious incident involving aircraft other than specified in Annex II to Regulation (EC) No 216/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 February 2008 on common rules in the field of civil aviation and establishing a European Aviation Safety Agency (6) shall be the subject of a safety investigation in the Member State in the territory of which the accident or serious incident occurred.*
2. *When an aircraft, other than specified in Annex II to Regulation (EC) No 216/2008, registered in a Member State is involved in an accident or serious incident the location of which cannot be definitely established as being in the territory of any State, a safety investigation shall be conducted by the safety investigation authority of the Member State of registration.*
3. *The extent of safety investigations referred to in paragraphs 1, 2 and 4 and the procedure to be followed in conducting such safety investigations shall be determined by the safety investigation authority, taking into account the lessons it expects to draw from such investigations for the improvement of aviation safety, including for those aircraft with a maximum take-off mass less than or equal to 2 250 kg.*

4. *Safety investigation authorities may decide to investigate incidents other than those referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2, as well as accidents or serious incidents to other types of aircraft, in accordance with the national legislation of the Member States, when they expect to draw safety lessons from them.*

Based on the findings of the site inspection and with regard to Article 5 (1) of Regulation (EU) No 996/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council, the head of the TSB decided that an investigation is required and will be launched.

In the course of the investigation the IC has taken the following steps:

- carried out a site inspection;
- interviewed witnesses;
- obtained data recorded by the air navigation service provider;
- obtained the recorded radio communication of the airport involved;
- obtained the papers of the Flight instructor and the Student Pilot;
- obtained the documentation of the ATO regarding operation and trainings;
- obtained data from the ATO's safety manager.

Investigation Principles

This investigation is being carried out by Transportation Safety Bureau on the basis of the following disciplines.

- Regulation (EU) No 996/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 October 2010 on the investigation and prevention of accidents and incidents in civil aviation and repealing Directive 94/56/EC,
- Act XCVII of 1995 on aviation,
- Annex 13 identified in the Appendix of Act XLVI. of 2007 on the declaration of the annexes to the Convention on International Civil Aviation signed in Chicago on 7th December 1944,
- Act CLXXXIV of 2005 on the safety investigation of aviation, railway and marine accidents and incidents (referred to as Kbvt. throughout the document),
- NFM (Ministry for National Development) Regulation 70/2015 (XII.1) on safety investigation of aviation accidents and incidents, as well as on detailed investigation for operators,
- In matters not covered by Kbvt., Act CL of 2016 on General Public Administration Procedures

The competence of the Transportation Safety Bureau of Hungary is based on Government Regulation № 230/2016. (VII.29.) on the assignment of a transportation safety body and on the dissolution of Transportation Safety Bureau with legal succession.

Pursuant to the aforesaid legislation,

- Transportation Safety Bureau of Hungary shall investigate aviation accidents and serious incidents.
- Transportation Safety Bureau of Hungary may investigate aviation and incidents which – in its judgement – could have led to accidents of more severe consequences in different circumstances.
- Transportation Safety Bureau of Hungary is independent of any person or entity that may have interests in conflict with the objectives of the investigating body.
- In addition to the aforementioned legislation, TSB of Hungary shall conduct safety investigations in line with ICAO Docs 9756 and 6920 Manual of Aircraft Accident Investigation.
- This Report shall not be binding, nor shall an appeal be lodged against it.
- The original of this report was written in Hungarian.

No conflict of interest has been identified between safety investigators appointed to the IC. No investigator assigned with a safety investigation has been involved as an expert in any other procedure pertaining to the same case and shall not do so in the future.

The IC shall retain all data and information having come to their knowledge in the course of the safety investigation. Furthermore, the IC shall not be obliged to make such data and information available to other authorities, whose disclosure could have been legally refused by their original owner.

This Final Report is based on the Draft Report prepared by the IC and shall be sent to all involved parties for comments, as set forth by the relevant regulations.

No comments on the draft report were received from the interested parties within the legal deadline.

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With the exceptions stipulated by law, this report or any part thereof may be used in any form, provided that context is maintained and clear references are made to the cited source.

Translation

This document has been translated from Hungarian. Although efforts have been made to provide a translation as accurate as possible, discrepancies between the versions might occur. In such eventuality, the Hungarian version shall prevail.

Factual information

Flight History

The purpose of the mishap flight of the Student and the Instructor was to carry out the multi-engine class training of the Student. In accordance with the organization's regular practice they flew from the training organization's base airport (Gödöllő Airport - LHGD) to Békéscsaba on the first day of the training. The first task of the training was the cross country flight and 4 landings, followed by a 45-minute long break. Afterwards the training continued at Békéscsaba airport, when 6 landings were performed. These flights were the Students first flights with this type of aircraft.

On the day of the event - the second day of the training - they started their flight in the morning hours, the Student flew the aircraft under the supervision of the Instructor. After two uneventful touch and goes, the third turn and the approach were initiated at a higher than normal altitude to Runway 17L. The Student reported, that he had executed the tasks according to the checklist, released the landing gear and checked the lights indicating the landing gear's locked position. According to the Instructor's report, he did not fully check the Student's moves nor the lights indicating the position of the landing gear. During touch down the Instructor noticed that the rotating propeller blades were touching the asphalt of the Runway, then he took control of the aircraft, and the aircraft landed with the belly of the aircraft with the landing gear retracted. After the landing, the Instructor set the landing gear control lever to released position, the other control levers to default position, and then switched the power off on the aircraft that had come to rest on the runway.

The propellers of both engines of the aircraft were damaged, the antennas located on the belly of the aircraft were broken, and the sliding plates located on this part were damaged.

While touching the ground, the still rotating propeller blades left small impact marks on the asphalt surface, which slightly damaged the surface of the asphalt runway. No other damage came to the attention of the IC.

Conclusions

The IC attributed the incident to human factors related to the Instructor. The direct cause of the serious incident was missing to extend the landing gear, missing to check if it had been done and missing to correct this action. The Student contributed to the event by failing to extend the landing gear.

The risk of similar incidents can be reduced by the correct use of checklists in case of the Student and by conscious and complete control of the Student's actions and movements in case of the Instructor.

In addition to the above, the IC identified the following contributing factors:

- Student's lack of theoretical and cabin familiarization training;
- Student's lack of practice in the use of checklists;
- Hungarian signs in the flight deck.

The Investigation Committee of the Transportation Safety Bureau found no grounds to issue a safety recommendation.

Safety Recommendations

The IC issued no safety recommendation.

Dated in Budapest, on 13 December 2022