

KÖZLEKEDÉSBIZTONSÁGI SZERVEZET TRANSPORTATION SAFETY

FINAL REPORT

2006-028-6 MARINE INCIDENT

20th September 2006 Collision of passenger ships MS Mozart and MS Csárdás

A-40158 / 01290

The sole objective of the technical investigation is to reveal the causes and circumstances of marine casualties, serious and very serious casualties as well as marine incidents, and to initiate the necessary technical measures and make recommendations in order to prevent similar cases in the future. It is not the purpose of this activity to apportion blame or liability.

This present investigation was conducted on the basis of

- Act XLII of 1995 on marine transport,
- SOLAS 1974/1978 and Act XI of 2001 on its proclamation,
- Act CLXXXIV of 2005 on the technical investigation of aviation, rail and marine accidents and incidents (hereinafter referred to as Kbvt.),
- Decree 9/2006 (II.27.) of Minister of Economy and Transport (MET) on the detailed rules regarding technical investigation of serious marine accidents and incidents.
- In absence of other related regulation of the Kbvt., the Transportation Safety Bureau of Hungary conducted the investigation in accordance with Act CXL of 2004 on the general rules of administrative authority procedure and service,
- The competence of the Transportation Safety Bureau of Hungary is based on the Kbvt. until 31st December 2006 and on Government Decree 278/2006 (XII. 23.) from 1st January 2007 respectively.

Abbreviations

TSB	Transportation Safety Bureau				
MTW (KHVM)	Ministry of Transportation, Telecommunication and Water (Közlekedési, Hírközlési és Vízügyi Minisztérium)				
MET (GKM) IC	Ministry of Economy and Transport (Gazdasági és Közlekedési Minisztérium) Investigating Committee				
Kbvt.	Act CLXXXIV of 2005 on the technical investigation of aviation, rail and marine accidents and incidents				
SOLAS	Safety of Life at Sea				
VDR	Voyage Data Recorder				
RSOE	National Association of Radio Distress-signalling and				
NAVINFO	Infocommunications Marine Emergency Assistance and Information System				
NTA	National Transport Authority				
MS	Motor Ship				

Summary

ininary			
Event category	Marine incident		
MS Mozart Manufacturer Type Registration Owner Operator Date and time of the event (UTC) location Number of fatally or seriously injured	Deggendorf Shipyard, Germany River cruise boat A-40158 Deilmann GmbH & Co.KG Deilmann GmbH & Co.KG Approximately 14 hours 20 minutes, 20 th September 2006. River kilometre 1645,8, Danube, Budapest, Hungary None		
Damage to ship	Minor		
Country of registry	Germany		
Registration authority	ZSUK Mainz		
Authority supervising manufacturing	-		
MS Csárdás Manufacturer Type Registration Owner Operator Date and time of the event (UTC) Iocation Number of fatally or seriously injured	Moldavia River boat 01290 SENEP Kft. Szeged Vendéglő Kft. Budapest, Hungary SENEP Kft. Szeged Vendéglő Kft. Budapest, Hungary Approximately 14 hours 20 minutes, 20 th September 2006. River kilometre 1645,8, Danube, Budapest, Hungary None		
Damage to ship Country of registry Registration authority Authority supervising manufacturing Competent investigating authority	Substantial Hungary National Transport Authority – Regional Directorate of Central Hungary – Marine Operational Safety and Registry Department g Moldavia TSB		

Synopsis

Data of the investigation

The incident was reported to the duty services personnel of TSB by the officer on duty of Danube River Police at 16:05 (LT).

The duty services personnel of TSB reported the event

- to the Head of Duty Services Department at 16 hours 10 minutes on 20th September 2006, then
- to the duty services personnel of the Marine Department of NTA at 16 hours 11 minutes

The Director-General of TSB assigned the following Investigating Committee (hereinafter referred to as IC) to investigate the marine incident:

Head of IC	Gábor Wimmer - Accident investigator
Member of IC	Dalma Orosz – Head of Marine Department
Member of IC	László Gréz – On-site investigator technician

Direct cause of the incident

It is most likely that the skipper of MS Csárdás evaluated the distance between his boat and MS Mozart incorrectly. As a result, MS Csárdás was too close when MS Mozart started her turn. The MS Mozart eventually collided by her right astern into the back of the portside of MS Csárdás.

This present final report

was based on the preliminary report prepared by the IC and accepted by the Director-General of TSB. The preliminary report was sent to the relevant parties - defined by law - for reflections. At the same time, the relevant parties and organisations were also informed and invited to the closing discussion of the preliminary report.

In the course of the procedure, the IC

- conducted the necessary investigations and took measures in order to fulfil the objectives of the technical investigation within reasonable time:
- examined the site of the occurrence, the maritime infrastructure, the vessels and their accessories, and the damages,
- interviewed the persons in possession of relevant information.

During the technical investigation

- the IC received all relevant information and records which were in possession of the owner and the operator of the vessels, the crews, the operator of the port and the marine transport authority.
- The following bodies cooperated in carrying out the technical investigation: bodies responsible for issuing licence, conducting the water-worthiness examination of the vessels, issuing the water-worthiness certificate, operating, maintaining and repairing the vessels, the operator of the port as well as the marine transport authority.

Incompatibility did not stand against the members of the IC.

The members of the IC performed their tasks under the control of the IC Head.

Persons participating in the technical investigation did not act as experts in other procedures concerning the same case and shall not do so in the future.

1. Factual information

The captains and crews of the vessels involved were questioned and the minutes of the sessions were completed by the IC. The investigation was conducted on two sites: investigation concerning MS Mozart on the international pontoon of PassNave Passenger Shipping Ltd, and that of Csárdás at port Helia at Szent István park, Budapest, Hungary.

1.1. The course of the event

According to the account of the skipper of MS Mozart, he checked that it was safe to complete a turning manoeuvre and initiated the turn. He announced his intentions on channel 10 in German and in Hungarian, and he also sounded the horn as required by the marine regulations. The ship was already at right angle with the direction of river flow when he heard and felt a crash from the back of the ship.

1.2. Injuries to persons

None of the 202 people aboard MS Mozart (129 passengers and 73 crew members) was injured.

None of the 20 people aboard MS Csárdás (17 passengers and 3 crew members) was injured.

1.3. Damage to ships

The MS Mozart was only slightly damaged. Only a minor scratch was detectable and the paint came off where the two ships collided.

The MS Csárdás sustained substantial damage. Parts of the galley sidewall and galley furniture as well as 6-8 metres of the railing on the portside were completely damaged.

1.4. Other damage

None.

1.5. Personnel information

1.5.1. The captain of MS Mozart

Age and gender Citizenship Qualification	44-year-old male Hungarian Cat. "A" skipper				
License:	Sulina-Regensburg 2379)	(between	river	kms	0-
Medical certification valid until Experience	No data 25 years				

1.5.2. The captain of MS Csárdás

Age and gender	70-year-old male
Citizenship	Hungarian
Qualification	Cat. "A" skipper
License:	Commercial (between river kms 1433-1850)
Medical certification valid until	No data
Experience	40 years

1.6. Ship information

MS Mozart river cruising ship

Registration Ship number Year of manufacturing Water-worthiness certificate Valid until **MS Csárdás river boat** Registration Ship number Year of manufacturing Water-worthiness certificate Valid until 002170 A-40158 1999 No. 5805 Sg 21st January 2009.

01290 8601290 1987 8601290 28th September 2006.

1.7. Meteorological information

Good visibility.

Temperature: 20°C

Sunny weather.

Light North wind.

Water level: 148 cm.

1.8. Aids to navigation

The usage and condition of navigation equipment had no effect on the incident, therefore their analysis was not required.

1.9. Communications

The radio equipment on the ships involved in the incident worked normally and had no effect on the incident.

1.10. Data recorders

The ships involved in the incident did not have data recorders on board.

1.11. Additional information

The IC did not receive any additional information.

2. Analysis

The recent years have seen a substantial increase in the number of passenger boats on the Danube, especially during the peak tourist season (summertime). The heavier traffic adds another load to skippers, captains, and other personnel working in the river navigation dealing with shipping of commercial goods on the Danube. The pressure to keep the timetable while navigating among other boats and keep track of them requires a high level of alertness from the crews, and eventually it can lead to an error even by highly experienced captains doing simple manoeuvres.

3. Conclusions

The skipper of MS Mozart signalled the ship's turn in advance a number of times. The two skippers consulted before the incident by radio on channel 10 and agreed that MS Csárdás would slow down and give MS Mozart a safe turning space. The skipper of MS Csárdás evidently failed to follow the conditions agreed upon, and due to the inadequate distance and the draw-in effect, the two vessels collided. The MS Csárdás sustained heavy superstructure damage at her portside near the galley.

The cause of the incident

The most likely cause of the accident was that the captain of MS Csárdás miscalculated the safe distance between the two vessels, the optimal navigation speed, and the draw-in effect, therefore the MS Csárdás manoeuvred too close to the turning MS Mozart.

4. Safety recommendations

BA2006-028-6_01: The IC recommends the NTA to extend the monitoring of VHF communication between boats to all navigation channels because the content of radio traffic (including time and position data) could be useful in accident/incident investigations. At present, channel 22 is continuously monitored and recorded; monitoring of channel 10 is functioning in Budapest but recording is not available. Expansion of channel 10 monitoring beyond the city borders is underway, start of a system test run is expected soon.

Note: the boaters prefer using non-monitored channels (for example channel 10).

BA2006-028-6_02: The IC recommends the NTA to install a simplified version of data recorders widely used on deep sea passenger ships and aircraft to river boats and deep sea cargo ships. The present regulations require only deep sea passenger ships and ferries to have a VDR (Voyage Data Recorder) system on board.

Introduction of such a system to river navigation cannot be done overnight; there is much work to be done with regard to legal, economic, infrastructural, and technological preconditions.

BA2006-028-6_03: The IC recommends the NTA to designate a turning space of adequate width to ease turning manoeuvres of ships longer than 100-110 meters on the Danube. The implementation of this measure also takes considerable time and shipping companies would have to prepare for and adapt to this new regulation.

Budapest, 11th December 2007.

Dalma Orosz


Member of IC


Gábor Wimmer Head of IC László Gréz

Member of IC

Photos of MS Mozart







Photos of MS Csárdás



