The full, official version of the final report is only available in Hungarian language

2009-0443-5

On 5 September 2009 at 09:23 hrs, train no. IC 75-2 passed entry signal 'B' signal at danger at Nagylapos crossover and approached the track of Nagylapos station on which train no. 7442 was standing. The movements inspector noticed the occurrence and gave a 'Stop' signal to train IC 75-2 (which was running with approximately 10 km/h speed). Train IC 75-2 stopped 150 metres from the rear of train no. 7442.

The block system between the two stations developed a fault due to the previous day's storm. As a consequence, block signal no. AT376 became inoperative (red light was on the signal) and it was impossible to send clear signal onto entry signal 'B' of Nagylapos crossover. At the same time, traffic control was also impossible between Nagylapos and Gyoma.

The IC concluded in the course of the investigation that several factors contributed to the occurrence of the accident. These were as follows:

- The staff did not comply with the regulations of the written order given at Mezőtúr station when travelling with train no. IC75-2.
    - The Unified Vigilance Warning and Train Control Device (EÉVB) was not switched off at the right place.
    - The 'look-out service' i.e. a second person on board the locomotive ordered at Mezőtúr station could not prevent the accident.
- Having passed the entry signal, they followed behind the train standing in the occupied block section.
- This was the first occasion the engine driver of train no. IC 75-2 had driven a train after the section had been reconstructed and he had not been informed about the changes.

Having evaluated the available data and information, the IC issued five safety recommendations.

CONCLUSIONS

Factual statements directly connected to the occurrence of the accident

- Train no. IC 75-2 passed entry signal 'B' at danger at Nagylapos crossover without permission.
- The Unified Vigilance Warning and Train Control Device (EÉVB) of the locomotive of train no. IC75-2 was not switched off at the place prescribed in the regulations. Therefore the switched off EÉVB was unable to perform its safety function (i.e. to stop the train). As a result, the train passed a block signal and the entry signal of Nagylapos crossover with high speed.
- The 'look-out service' i.e. a second person on board the locomotive ordered at Mezőtúr station could not prevent the accident. (This occurrence draws the attention to the importance of human factors when travelling under less safe circumstances.)

- Having passed the entry signal, the staff did not act as prescribed in the regulation, but the continued their way and followed behind the train standing in the block section.

Factual statements indirectly connected to the occurrence of the accident

- The block system between the two stations developed a fault due to the previous day's storm. As a consequence, block signal no. AT376 became inoperative (red light was on the signal) and it was impossible to send clear signal onto entry signal 'B' of Nagylapos crossover.
- This was the first occasion the engine-driver of train no. IC 75-2 had driven a train after the section had been reconstructed. Nor had the engine-driver driven a train in this section (of railway line no. 120) in the time period when the engine-drivers were informed about the changes.
- The IC believes that the lack of line knowledge in the changing circumstances as well as the fault of the signal box together contributed to the occurrence of the accident.

Other risk factors

- Based on the information available to the IC, there is no designated place in the area of the crossover where the EÉVB can be switched off according to Regulation E.1. Thus the engine-driver would not have been able to switch the EÉVB off as prescribed.
- The current regulations with regard to giving written orders at Nagylapos crossover are unrealistic and practically impossible to execute. Compliance with them creates significant disruptions in railway traffic. The current regulations themselves carry the risk of more serious accidents to occur.